Drawing together social psychologists' concerns with equality and cognitive psychologists' concerns with scientific inference, 6 studies (N ϭ 841) showed how implicit category norms make the generation and test of hypothesis about race highly asymmetric. Having shown that Whiteness is the default race of celebrity actors (Study 1), Study 2 used a variant of Wason's (1960) rule discovery task to demonstrate greater difficulty in discovering rules that require specifying that race is shared by White celebrity actors than by Black celebrity actors. Clues to the Whiteness of White actors from analogous problems had little effect on hypothesis formation or rule discovery (Studies 3 and 4) . Rather, across Studies 2 and 4 feedback about negative cases-non-White celebrities-facilitated the discovery that White actors shared a race, whether participants or experimenters generated the negative cases. These category norms were little affected by making White actors' Whiteness more informative (Study 5). Although participants understood that discovering that White actors are White would be harder than discovering that Black actors are Black, they showed limited insight into the information contained in negative cases (Study 6). Category norms render some identities as implicit defaults, making hypothesis formation and generalization about real social groups asymmetric in ways that have implications for scientific reasoning and social equality.
Consider two drugs, X and Y, used to treat the same illness. Both drugs are effective in the population at large, but drug X causes harmful side effects among men that outweighs its benefits, whereas drug Y causes similarly harmful side effects among women. Until the early 1990s, medical research practices in the United States would have allowed drug Y to go to market more quickly than drug X, as research trials tended to include men in far greater proportions than women. Consequently, men experienced health advantages, which these hypothetical drugs help to illustrate. Men who suffered from the relevant illness could have access to the effective drug Y, whereas sick women would have had no access to drug X. Men, but not women, were protected from side effects of commercially available drugs by clinical trials, and the side effects of X-but not Y-would have been detected during all male trials. Mindful of these inequalities, in 1993, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) Revitalization Act demanded that women and members of ethnic minorities be included in NIHfunded research unless there were compelling reasons, other than cost, to exclude members of these groups. These policy shifts were demanded by groups concerned with health inequalities for women, ethnic minorities, and people living with HIV/AIDS. These groups argued that the ways that scientists construct normative samples to make inferences about populations can directly impact social equality (Epstein, 2007) .
The shift in sampling demanded by the 1993 NIH Revitalization Act illustrates the mutual relevance of social psychologists' concerns with social equality and cognitive psychologists' concerns with scientific thinking. The present research draws these two areas of research closer by testing the hypothesis that people spontaneously generate and test hypotheses from observations of individuals in ways that are strongly affected by the extent to which those individuals' group identities are taken as defaults for larger social categories. Social psychologists have described how group interests can lead people to set general standards from their in-group more than from out-groups, with the result that those standards seem fair but still work to the in-group's advantage (Robbins & Krueger, 2005; Wenzel, Mummendey, & Waldzus, 2003) . More broadly, theories of social power emphasize that higher status groups can retain power even in climates that favor social equality by successfully representing their own traits and interests as applying equally to everyone (Simon & Oakes, 2006) . However, the cognitive processes by which such subtle effects of defaulting operate when evaluating scientific evidence are not well researched. Here, I examine the process by which one common default social identity-Whiteness-affects the process by which people generate and test hypotheses about the common features that people share. Kahneman and Miller's (1986) description of category norms grounds my understanding of how defaults are instantiated in working memory representations of social categories and affect scientific thinking. In the following text I review Kahneman and Miller' s account of category norms and the evidence that category norms render scientific thinking about real social groups highly asymmetric. Next I review the literature on the oldest method for studying how people generate hypotheses and the data to test them in psychology; Wason's (1960) rule-discovery task. I then introduce the studies which use a new variant of the Wason task designed to examine how defaults impact hypothesis formation and test when people reason about familiar social categories. These studies go beyond existing social psychological research on norm setting to demonstrate how category norms create asymmetries in the breadth of hypotheses that people call to mind, contributing to unequal standard-setting for purely cognitive nonprejudicial reasons. They also expand research on the Wason task to familiar social categories.
Category Norms and Scientific Thinking
Within many social categories, information about gender, race, sexuality, and other important identity attributes is implicit (Kahneman & Miller, 1986) , assumed to go without saying , or "folded in" (Bodenhausen & Peery, 2009 ). In some cases, preconscious assumptions about social identity completely override declarative knowledge and create reasoning errors. Consider the now famous surgeon riddle (Reynolds, Garnham, & Oakhill, 2006) :
A man and his son were away for a trip. They were driving along the highway when they had a terrible accident. The man was killed outright but the son was alive, although badly injured. The son was rushed to the hospital and was to have an emergency operation. On entering the operating theater, the surgeon looked at the boy, and said, "I can't do this operation. This boy is my son. " (p. 886) When presented with this story, only about half of participants successfully guess that the surgeon is the injured boy's mother (Reynolds et al., 2006) . Participants who fail the riddle do not lack the knowledge that some surgeons are women. Rather gender information is automatically and nonconsciously activated by reference to the surgeon and is difficult to change. Kahneman and Miller's (1986) description of category norms provides a theoretical understanding of such effects of implicit knowledge on thinking. They described a category norm as an implicit representation of a category that is constructed in working memory from available exemplars of the category that are stored in long-term memory. Common features of the exemplars that are recruited to construct the category, such as the maleness of surgeons, become implicit in the category norm. Category norms both shape expectations about the features that members of the category will possess and create the experience of surprise when individual category members possess different features. For example, the attribute of being male falls within the category norm constructed for "surgeons," which is activated automatically beyond conscious awareness upon reading the surgeon riddle. Consequently, and for reasons that are hard to notice, the inference that the surgeon might be a woman is blocked.
The effects of category norms on scientific thinking about meaningful social groups have been repeatedly demonstrated in studies of the explanation of group differences. When people construct novel explanations of empirical differences between such groups, they tend to construct category norms that include higher-status identities and explain group differences by positioning lower-status groups as "the effect to be explained." For example, spontaneous explanations of gender differences focus on attributes of women more than attributes of men (e.g., Hegarty, 2006; Miller, Taylor, & Buck, 1991) , explanations of sexuality differences focus on lesbians and gay men more than on heterosexuals (Hegarty & Pratto, 2001 , 2004 , and explanations of race differences focus on African Americans more than on European Americans . These asymmetries in scientific thinking are large and have been observed in scientists published explanations as well as in experiments (Hegarty & Buechel, 2006) . Furthermore, such asymmetric explanations have social effects, by communicating and reproducing assumptions about power differences. When people read asymmetric explanations, they stereotype the groups linguistically positioned as "the effect to be explained: as possessing less agency, less power, and less legitimate power than the group linguistically positioned as the background norm, even when they are a member of the group-to-be-explained themselves" (Bruckmüller, 2013 , see Hegarty & Bruckmüller, 2013 for a review). The studies below build on these findings about explanation asymmetry and assess how category norms affect hypothesis formation and test in the domain of race.
Race is a very important social category and is one of three identities-along with gender and age-that robustly leads to stereotyping and discrimination across human societies (Fiske, 1998 : Sidanius & Pratto, 1999 . Scholars across disciplines have emphasized that "race" is a category that is constructed differently in different times and places for different social purposes (Peery & Bodenhausen, 2009; Eberhardt & Randall, 1997; Omi & Winant, 1994; Phinney, 1996) . The implicit status of Whiteness as an invisible or taken-for-granted high-status identity in Western cultures has often been described (Dyer, 1997; Fine, Weis, Powell, & Wong, 1997; McIntosh, 1998; Morrison, 1993) . Social psychologists have similarly pointed out that individuals who are White appear to "have race" less than do non-White individuals do (Fiske, 1998) . White people are more readily categorized by race (Zárate & Smith, 1990; Stroessner, 1996) and more quickly associated with national categories than are members of other ethnic groups (Devos & Banaji, 2005 ). Yet people are quicker to stereotype a person on the basis of race if they are known to be Black rather than White (Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2000) . Leach, Snider, and Iyer (2002) made this point most explicit by arguing that generic statements about Whites ("Americans are still prejudiced against Blacks") appear easier to understand than generic statements about Blacks ("Americans still earn less money than do Whites"). Some psychologists have further expressed concern that this assumed norm of Whiteness biases scientific thinking about similarities and differences among people (Cole, 2009; Graham, 1992; S. Sue, 1999 , D. Sue, 2004 . In sum, multiple studies, commentaries and theories express the belief that White people are the assumed norm for many social categories and express concern for its social consequences.
I argue that the normative status of Whiteness in category norms also affects the range of the hypotheses that people construct and test to account for common features among well-known people. Specifically, I argue that when Whiteness falls within the category norm, that the Whiteness of White people goes unnoticed. Consequently, it can be fiendishly difficult to discover a true hypothesis that specifies that White people are White. However, as non-White This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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identities fall beyond such category norms in many more cases, it is more often trivially easy to discover a logically equivalent hypothesis that non-White people have a shared race. To create a microcosm in which hypotheses about the impact of category norms on hypothesis testing could be examined, the studies tested students' reasoning about celebrity film stars. I focused on popular culture because participants could be assumed to possess enough domain-specific knowledge allowing them to call to mind a range of well-known celebrities to test their hypotheses. conducted the most detailed investigation of the influence of race and gender category norms on reasoning about celebrity categories. These authors first observed that Whiteness and maleness are assumed norms for most categories of famous people. Next, they asked participants to list either typical or atypical features of famous individuals in these celebrity categories. Supporting a category norm account, participants rarely thought of race or gender as features that made a celebrity typical of their occupational category, but commonly listed non-normative race and gender identities as atypical features of celebrities who possessed those identities. In a final study involving dyads, participants gave a series of clues to the identities of celebrities who possessed typical or atypical race and gender identities. "Clue-givers" who were not allowed to use race or gender as clues in this context experienced greater difficulty communicating about atypical celebrities but not about typical celebrities. This difficulty arose because the clue-givers' partners assumed the normative race and gender identities of the celebrity upon hearing their occupation. In other words, simply by not mentioning atypical race or gender identities, clue-givers implicitly constructed the identities of the people they held in mind as having normative race and gender identities. Building on this work, the present studies examine how students formulate and test hypotheses about the features that well-known celebrities share and the impact of category norms involving race on that process.
Forming Hypotheses and Discovering Rules
The studies presented subsequently adapt Wason's (1960) rule discovery task. In this now-classic task, participants are told that the number sequence 2-4 -6 conforms to a rule that the experimenter holds in mind and which participants must discover. Participants proceed by generating number sequences and the experimenter gives feedback as to whether each number sequence conforms to their rule or not. When participants feel ready, they guess what the experimenter's rule might be. Generations of researchers have replicated Wason's (1960) original finding that the rule ("any sequence of increasing numbers") is rarely discovered on the first announcement of the rule. Informed by Popper's (1959) model of scientific discovery, Wason (1960) initially interpreted his findings as showing a problematic failure to generate number sequences that might eliminate the participant's own hypothesis. This interpretation of Wason's (1960) experiment inspired later research on interpersonal impression formation which similarly concluded that people search for information about other people that is biased in favor of evidence that confirms their initial impressions, showing a confirmation bias (e.g., Snyder & Swann, 1978) .
However, Wason's (1960) findings were open to more than one interpretation (see Wetherick, 1962) . In an important conceptual reanalysis, Klayman and Ha (1987) queried whether Wason had found evidence of a confirmation bias at all. In many variations of Wason (1960) study and in impression formation studies, people tend to generate positive tests of their existing hypotheses (ϩHtests). For example, if a participant in the Wason task holds the hypothesis that the experimenter's rule is "numbers increasing by two" then that participant is very likely to also generate a number sequence that conforms to that hypothesis (e.g., 4, 6, 8). Klayman and Ha (1987) argued convincingly that this behavior did not amount to a confirmation bias per se, and for two reasons. First, in the Wason (1960) task the first hypothesis most often suggested by the exemplar 2-4 -6 (i.e., "numbers increasing by two") was entirely contained by the experimenter's "true" rule (any sequence of increasing numbers). But one may also find oneself in a situation where either a hypothesis and a rule overlap, or the rule surrounds the hypothesis, or the hypothesis and the rule are disjointed (see Figure 1) . Second, Klayman and Ha (1987) asserted that hypotheses will typically refer to statistical minority phenomena. Accordingly, the attribution of confirmation bias is premature because "if you are attempting to predict a minority phenomenon, you are more likely to receive falsification with ϩHtests than -Htests" (Klayman & Ha, 1987, p. 217) . As positive tests are informative in many hypothesis testing environments, it may be rational to select them in the absence of any information about the environment. The merit of this analysis was demonstrated in later experiments in which participants tested hypotheses in a wider range of informatic environments than the original Wason task (Klayman & Ha, 1989) . Contemporary social psychological research in impression formation has also taken account of Klayman and Ha's (1987) work and carefully distinguishes positive testing from confirmation bias (Rusconi, Sacchi, Toscano, & Cherubini, 2012) .
Researchers from Wason (1960) onward have repeatedly noted that the generation of tests in the Wason task is habitually done by Figure 1 . Informatic relationships between initial hypotheses (H) and true rules to be discovered (T). Adapted from Klayman and Ha (1987) . This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
positive testing, but most effective when negative tests are generated. Success is more likely under dual goal conditions when participants consider both their original hypothesis and its complement as equally focal such that the distinction between positive and negative tests no longer exists (Tweney et al., 1980) . Success is also facilitated when participants are instructed to produce negative tests of their own hypothesis (e.g., Rossi, Caverni, & Girotto, 2001) . Kareev and Halberstadt's (1993) showed that participants' have insight into the information provided by positive and negative tests. Their participants imagined another hypothetical person engaged in the task and evaluated the utility of positive and negative tests. When told only the rule that this hypothetical person needed to discover, participants rated positive tests to be more useful clues. However, when also told the experimenter's rule, participants correctly perceived the greater value of negative tests. These studies jointly confirm that people appreciate the value of falsifying information in the Wason task but habitually rely on positive tests to discover hypotheses if the task is framed as Wason (1960) originally framed it. More recent research on the Wason (1960) task has been informed by Oaksford and Chater's (1994) iterative counterfactual model. Building on original studies by Farris and Revlin (1989) , this model describes how people extract regularities from available evidence to successfully generate new hypotheses and sequentially test those hypotheses. Research focuses on the question of which hypothesis are discovered by this process. Cherubini, Castelvecchio, and Cherubini (2005) showed that hypothesis discovery is particularly informed by informational regularities. Their participants saw several triples that varied in the presence or absence of high-and low-information regularities. When all triples shared highly distinctive similarities (i.e., all triples were number sequences increasing by two), then participants generated more restrictive hypotheses and were consequently less likely to hypothesize the correct rule. As this pattern was not moderated by hierarchical relational structures in the data presented, Cherubini et al. (2005) concluded that "generation of the initial hypothesis is affected exclusively by the informational facet of structure" (p. 324; emphasis in original). Ball (2006, 2012) found further evidence in dual goal studies for an influence of contrast classes on rule discovery. In their studies, the discovery of the category of triples "increasing numbers" was facilitated more by the information that a clearly descending sequence of numbers (e.g., 6 -4 -2) was a member of the complementary category than the information that a nondescending sequence was a member of that complementary category (e.g., 4 -4 -4). As 6 -4 -2 and 4 -4 -4 are equally informative clues, these authors invoked Oaksford's (2002) notion of the contrast class that is called to mind by negation to explain their results. Oaksford (2002) noted that not all logical members of the logical complementary class are made equally psychologically available by a negation. Rather, only the most likely, relevant or close alternatives to the category are brought to mind. Ball (2006, 2012) inferred that descending number sequences such as 6 -4 -2 prompted the complementary class of "increasing numbers" more quickly than did nondescending number sequences. Next, I describe the variant of the Wason task used here to examine the effects of category norms on hypothesis formation and test in regard to a social category.
The Present Research
The studies described in the following text introduce the celebrity guessing game (hereafter CGG), which is a robust and flexible adaptation of Wason's (1960) rule discovery task to examine how category norms implicating race impact the process by which people formulate and test hypotheses about social categories. Like Wason's original task, the CGG requires dual-search (Klahr & Dunbar, 1988) because it examines both the hypotheses that people entertain when generalizing from observations, and the ways in which people generate tests of their own hypotheses. The category norm hypothesis tested here is the claim that discovering a rule that requires specifying that White film stars share a race may be fiendishly difficult, just as it can be difficult to discover that 2, 4, 6 is an increasing number sequence (Wason, 1960) or that a surgeon could be a woman (Reynolds et al., 2006) . However, discovering a logically equivalent rule that three Black film stars share a race is comparatively easy, as race comes quickly to mind when it is a non-normative feature of individual celebrities within a given category . In other words, only hypothesis formation about White celebrities is predicted to be "color blind" (Apfelbaum, Sommers, & Norton, 2008) .
Research with the Wason (1960) task suggests some additional motivation for this hypothesis. To the extent that Black film stars are considered to be a minority group and White film stars a majority, then Black film stars' race is a more distinct, and potentially more informative feature than White film stars' race (see Cherubini et al., 2005) . Group size is an influence on the likelihood that a group identity will be taken as a category norm, and research on explanation have shown an influence of manipulating relative sample size on the group selected as the effect to be explained (e.g., Hegarty & Pratto, 2001 , Experiment 2, see Hegarty & Bruckmüller, 2013 for discussion).
Competing claims can be drawn from the literature on negation and contrast classes and applied to the CGG. These points are relevant to Studies 2 and 4 below where participants are provided with information that particular actors do not obey the experimenter's rule and Study 6 where participants generate guesses to help or hinder another person attempting to discover such a rule. Oaksford (2002) noted that negation in discourse often contradicts a presumed norm as when the statement "A whale is not a fish" negates the presumption that creatures who live in the ocean are normatively members of the available category "fish" (Horn, 2001 ). This claim is consistent with a large body of evidence that negation is marked, takes longer to processes than affirmation, and typically negates a proposition that is assumed to be part of the discursive common ground (Horn, 2001 ). As such, because actors are presumed to be White without saying so explicitly , then the information that Black actors do not conform to the experimenter's rule may suggest the default norm "White actors" more than the information that White actors do not conform to the rule suggests the alternative "Black actors."
On the one hand, Oaksford's (2002) model makes assumptions about statistical frequency which motivate the opposite prediction. He states that the probability of a (psychological) contrast class should be lower than its complement within the (logical) complement class. By this criterion, a statistical majority group-such as This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
White actors-is an unlikely contrast class, and the knowledge that Black actors do not belong to a category might lead to the contrast class "Latino/a actors" or "Asian actors" more quickly than to "White actors." I return to this point in discussing the relevant studies in subsequent paragraphs. Study 1 set the stage by confirming the assumption that Whiteness is a normative identity among famous actors. Study 2 introduced the CGG and tested the normative identity hypothesis against three plausible alternatives. Studies 3 and 4 replicated this test and explored the possibility that transfer from analogous problem would lead to the insight that White people share a common race. Study 5 examined the effects of changing the distinctiveness of actors' race and its relevance to the task. Study 6 borrowed and extended Kareev and Halberstadt (1993) methodology to examine participants' insight into the information provided by different tests of hypothesis in the CGG, and the extent to which their understanding was symmetrical or asymmetrical around the category of race.
Study 1: Whiteness as the Default Race of Celebrity Actors
Study 1 tested whether Whiteness was a category norm for race within the category of celebrity actors, as suggested by , and the continuing overrepresentation of Whites in leading Hollywood roles (Smith, Choueiti, & Pieper, 2016) . Two predictions follow from this hypothesis. First, White actors should be more frequently called to mind than non-White actors as exemplars of the category. Second, race should also be a less available feature of White than are non-White actors.
Method
Participants. Forty-three women and 17 men studying psychology at a U.S. university participated (M age ϭ 19.82 years, range ϭ 18 -26 years). They defined their ethnicities using U.S. census categories as White (n ϭ 45), Asian (n ϭ 6), Black/African American (n ϭ 3), Black and White (n ϭ 2), Native Hawaiian/ Pacific Islander (n ϭ 1), both White and Asian (n ϭ 3).
Materials and procedure. Participants completed a 3-page. questionnaire. The first page presented the following prompt, "In the spaces below, please write the name of 10 Hollywood actors. Write down the names of the first ten actors that come into your mind." Ten numbered blank lines followed this prompt. The second page varied according to whether participants were randomly assigned to the Black actors or White actors condition. In all conditions, this page presented the following prompt, "Below are the names of three famous Hollywood actors. Complete the sentences below by writing down five things that all three of these actors have in common." A list of three male actors with a similar age span followed in each condition. In the Black Actors condition, the actors listed were Will Smith, Denzel Washington, and Morgan Freeman. In the White Actors condition, the actors listed were Hugh Jackman, Bruce Willis, and Al Pacino. In each condition, the list of actors' names was followed by the sentence stem "All of these actors . . ." repeated five times. The third and final page asked participants to report demographic items. These materials were distributed and completed in class under supervision.
Participants were thanked and debriefed as to the study's purpose after data had been collected.
Results and Discussion
All actors called to mind by the participants were categorized as White, Black or Other. All such categorizations of celebrities in Studies 1 through 5 are available from the author upon request. Both predictions were confirmed. In the first task, participants generated an average of 9.10 responses, naming White actors in 90.1% of cases, Black actors in 7.5% of cases, and actors who were neither White nor Black in 2.5% of cases. In the second task, participants listed an average of 4.49 common features of the three actors. Race was mentioned by 93.1% of participants in the Black actors condition and 20% of participants in the White actors condition (i.e., 27 of 29 participants vs. 6 of 30 participants). This difference was highly significant, 2 (1, N ϭ 59) ϭ 31.97, p Ͻ .0001. In sum, White actors were very frequently called to mind, and race was far less frequently called to mind as a shared feature of White actors than Black actors. These findings suggest that Whiteness remains the default race included and made implicit in category norms for the category of celebrity actors.
Study 2: Discovering Rules About Race in the CGG
Study 2 introduced the CGG to test the effects of category norms on hypothesis generation. Participants read the names of three celebrity actors and guessed at the commonality or rule that the experimenter held in mind. In a deviation from Wason's (1960) original procedure, participants generated the name of a further celebrity and guessed the experimenter's rule at each turn of the game. This change was introduced to ensure that participants generated several hypotheses during the CGG and brokered their greater semantic knowledge of popular culture than of number sequences. In response to each turn, the experimenter informed the participant both whether the celebrity they named fit the experimenter's rule or not, and whether or not they had correctly guessed that rule.
The study was designed to test the category norm hypothesis that participants would experience particular difficulty in discovering rules that required them to specify the race of the White celebrities. Three plausible alternative hypotheses were considered. First consider the reticence to mention race hypothesis. Apfelbaum et al. (2008) demonstrated a reticence among White participants to mention race to avoid appearing racist to themselves or to their partners in a guessing game about celebrities. Their results suggest the possibility that participants would be reticent to focus a hypothesis on race in the CGG to avoid appearing racist themselves. This prediction contrasts with the category norm hypothesis here. Apfelbaum et al.'s (2008) examined when participants chose to mention the race of individuals in a guessing game after those participants had noticed race. In contrast, the category norm hypothesis considers the extent to which people notice the race of White individuals in the first place. Furthermore, Apfelbaum et al. (2008) observed a tendency to mention race in general, whereas the category norm hypothesis specifies a difficulty only in noticing the race of White people. To tease apart these predictions, participants were assigned to conditions in which they had to discover race-specific rules from observations of This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
both Black and White actors in Study 2, and that required them to specify hypotheses that referred to Black people and to White people. A second alternative hypothesis is suggested by the possibility that it could be difficult to discover rules that specify White people as a group under any circumstances. This hypothesis was considered for two reasons. First, Whiteness has been described as a cultural default in Western culture as noted earlier. Second, Ha (1987, 1989) theorized and observed that people more often generate hypotheses that specify statistical minority rather than statistical majority phenomena. The category White actors is less distinct than the category Black actors (see Cherubini et al., 2005) . Accordingly, even if category norms fail to inhibit the discovery that three White actors share the characteristic of being White, participants might not announce hypotheses that specify White people as a group because the category is a statistical majority that lacks distinctiveness, and so appears to be a less suitable rule.
To tease apart the category norm hypothesis from the statistical majority hypothesis, Study 2 pitted against each other the difficulty of noticing that White people are White from the difficulty of reaching a conclusion that referred to White people as a group. Study 2 contained race-positive conditions in which the celebrity actors were said to possess something in common, and racenegative conditions, in which the names of three celebrity actors of the same race were presented and these actors were said to lack the shared commonality that the experimenter held in mind (see Rossi et al., 2001 for a similar variant of Wason's, 1960 task) . The category norm hypothesis and the statistical majority hypothesis diverge in their predictions about these race-negative rule conditions. The category norm hypothesis predicts that participants will experience greater difficulty in formulating the hypothesis that White actors are not Black than the hypothesis that Black actors are not White because Whiteness is a normative feature of actors but Blackness is not. In contrast, the statistical majority hypothesis suggests greater difficulty in formulating the hypothesis that Black actors are not White than the hypothesis that White actors are not Black because only the former condition requires the participant to alight on the category White actors which names a statistical majority group. This critical test is somewhat tempered by the fact that these conditions imply negation, and for the reasons discussed in the introduction. I discuss this matter further subsequently.
A third and final prediction follows from the fact that Whiteness is an in-group identity only for some people, such that group identity may become salient for White people and non-White people differently (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) . Group projection processes could plausibly affect reasoning during the CGG such that participants draw more race-general and fewer race-specific hypotheses from their own in-group than from an out-group (Wenzel, Mummendey, & Waldzus, 2007) . As projection could explain why White people might fail to find race-specific rules from observations of White celebrities, both White and non-White participants were included in a key condition of the experiment.
Method
Pilot study. Studies 1 and 2 were conducted in different contexts, and a pilot study was conducted to select the names of actors who were equally famous and equally prototypical celebrity actors for use as stimuli in Studies 2 through 5. People sometimes generalize more readily from more prototypical category exemplars than from less prototypical exemplars (Osherson, Smith, Wilkie, López, & Shafir, 1990) . Such effects of category-based induction are not of interest here. The pilot study allowed a selection of Black and White celebrity actors for the stimuli used in Studies 2 through 5 who could be assumed to be equally typical film stars and to be equally famous.
Seventy-nine women and 15 men (M age ϭ 20.22 years, range ϭ 18 -45 years) were recruited as volunteers from public campus venues on the U.K. campus where Studies 2, 3, 4, and 6 were conducted. Participants were randomly assigned to rate either the fame (n ϭ 48) or the typicality (n ϭ 46) of 20 famous film actors on 7-point scales. These scales ranged from 1 (not at all famous) to 7 (very famous) and from 1 (not at all typical) to 7 (very typical) in the respective conditions. Two participants in the typicality condition were excluded as they did not respond to most of the items.
Three Black and three White actors were selected for use in the CGG on the basis of their fame and typicality ratings. 94, 5.72] ). The averaged fame and typicality ratings of the Black and White actors were similar (M fame ϭ 5.97, 5.83, respectively, M typicality ϭ 5.60, 5.51, respectively; both t Ͻ1).
As noted earlier, race can be constructed differently in different contexts (Omi & Winant, 1994) . One of the Black celebritiesHalle Berry-has identified publicly as both biracial and as Black at different points in her career (Barnett, 2011) . Halle Berry was categorized as Black, but the experiment's protocol specified that participants be withdrawn if they indicated disagreement with the racial categorization of any of the initial celebrity actors with which they were presented. This rule lead to the replacement of only one participant (Study 2) when she reported believing that Morgan Freeman was White at debriefing.
Participants. Seventy psychology students participated for course credit (44 women, 26 men M age ϭ 19.03 years, range ϭ 18 -26) in the principal study. Participants identified as White (n ϭ 60), Black (n ϭ 4), Asian (n ϭ 3), Filipino (n ϭ 2), and Indian (n ϭ 1). The predicted effects of category norms on success in the CGG were predicted to be large both because of the robust effects demonstrated in the literature on the Wason rule discovery task and the large effects of category norms on explanations of group differences. Accordingly, this study had a small sample size, comparable to several other classic studies in the reasoning literature.
Design. Each of the 60 White participants were randomly assigned to one cell of a 2 ϫ 3 experimental design defined by the celebrity actor's race (Black or White) and the experimenter's rule to be discovered (general rule vs. race-positive rule vs. raceThis document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
negative rule). All 10 non-White participants were assigned to the White actors, race-positive rule condition. Materials. All materials presented the CGG in which the task was to identify an unknown rule about well-known celebrities as quickly as possible. In the general rule and the race-positive rule conditions, written instructions briefed the participants as follows:
All of these celebrities fit a particular rule that I have in mind. In other words, some celebrities have something in common, and all of these three celebrities have that thing in common.
In the race-negative rule conditions, the word all was changed to none. Before playing the CGG, a practice trial was presented to check that the briefing had adequately communicated the game's rules to the participant. The practice trial presented three common household objects. In the general rule and race-positive rule conditions, participants were instructed to think of commonalities that the objects shared. Participants in the race-negative rule condition were instructed to think of commonalities that none of the three objects shared. Participants generated new object examples and guessed the rule. The practice trial concluded when the participant guessed a correct rule.
The booklets next presented the names of either the three Black or the three White celebrity actors derived from the pilot study. Their names were followed by 15 blank lines, which were presented over two landscape pages. Each line included a space for the participant to write down the name of a new celebrity labeled "Think of an additional name" and a space to write down a new guess at the experimenter's rule titled "Guess the rule." Next to each space was a box for the experimenter's feedback (a tick for correct responses, and a cross for incorrect responses). The last page of the booklet asked participants to list demographic information and to report on the subjective difficulty of the task using a scale ranging from 1 (very easy) to 7 (very difficult).
Procedure. On each trial, the participant generated a celebrity's name and guessed the experimenter's rule, and the experimenter fed back whether the celebrity did or did not fit the rule and whether or not the participant had correctly guessed the rule. The experiment was concluded when one of three events occurred; (1) the participant guessed the rule correctly, (2) the participant made 15 incorrect guesses, or (3) 20 min passed. The first outcome was recorded as successful rule discovery and the latter two outcomes were recorded as failure. In the general rule conditions, rules that specified that the celebrities' profession but that did not mention race were deemed correct. For example, mention of "film stars," "actors," or "Hollywood actors" were all correct, but mention of "African American actors" was not correct. In the race-positive rule and race-negative rule conditions, rules that explicitly mentioned the celebrities' race were deemed correct, irrespective of whether or not such rules specified the actors' occupation. In addition, in the race-positive rule and race-negative rule conditions, participants' rules were deemed correct irrespective of whether they mentioned a race that the celebrities shared or a race that they all lacked. For example, in the race-positive White actors condition, all of the following statements would be deemed evidence that the participant had correctly guessed the experimenter's rule. "All of them are White," "All of them are White film stars," "none of them are Black," and "none of them are Black actors." Experimental sessions included up to 3 participants, who were subsequently debriefed as to the study's purpose, and who agreed to maintain confidentiality about its purpose and methods. All experimenters were White in Studies 2 through 4.
Results
I tested Study 2's focal hypotheses against its alternatives. Four measures of problem difficulty were assessed for each participant; failure to solve the problem (coded as 1 for failure and 0 for success), the number of incorrect guesses made in the CGG, the time spent in the CGG in minutes, and self-reported subjective difficulty of the CGG. These measures of difficulty were correlated. Participants who took more time made more incorrect guesses, r (69) Compared with participants who failed the CGG, those who succeeded spent less time playing the game, made fewer guesses, and described the CGG as easier (all tϾ6, all p Ͻ .001). Data from all 70 participants was analyzed. I conducted log-linear analysis on success rates defined by the experimenter's rule (general rule vs. race-positive rule vs. race-negative rule) and the actors' race (Black vs. White) as independent between-subjects variables, and 3 ϫ 2 ANOVA for all other measures of problem difficulty. Tukey's post hoc tests (␣ ϭ .05) were used to interpret significant interactions (see Table 1 ).
Failure to solve the problem was examined first. The three-way interaction term in the fully saturated log-linear model was signif- Rule (n ϭ 10) (n ϭ 10) (n ϭ 10) (n ϭ 10) (n ϭ 10) (n ϭ 20) Table 1 ). In sum, in the White actors race-positive and race-negative rules conditions, 72.3% of participants failed the CGG (i.e., 22 of 30 participants) and in the remaining conditions, only 15% of participants failed it (i.e., 6 of 40 participants; see Table 2 ).
Analyses of all other measures corroborated this conclusion. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed that the number of guesses generated was affected by significant main effects of actor race 
Discussion
Study 2 confirmed the focal hypothesis that category norms impact scientific thinking by obscuring hypotheses that specify the identity of a normative group. Several plausible alternative hypotheses were tested but none of them garnered any support. Difficulty in the CGG could not be attributed to a general reticence to mention race (Apfelbaum et al., 2008) because success was common in the Black actors race-positive and Black actors racenegative rule conditions, and participants readily mentioned racial categories in these conditions.
The difficulty was not due to an inability to formulate rules about the statistical majority category White actors (Klayman & Ha, 1987) . In the Black actors race-negative rule condition, 80% of participants successfully guessed that none of the actors, Eddie Murphy, Halle Berry and Morgan Freeman were White. In contrast, only 30% of participants in the White actors race-negative rule condition successfully guessed that none of the actors Jim Carrey, Kate Winslet, and Colin Firth were Black. This support for the norm theory hypothesis could be qualified on the grounds that these conditions used negative cases. Reasoning experiments can be affected by the norms of conversational implicature (Hilton, 1990) , and negation is most often used to negate a proposition that is already presumed in the common ground (Horn, 2001) . However, the CGG was clearly scripted to be a guessing game, in which each participant's task was to discover something nonobvious, and the experimenter gave limited information. As such, the briefing should have insured that the participants did not presume that the experimenter would converse naturalistically through the giving of feedback. The possibility that these discursive factors influenced the generation and interpretation of negative cases is considered via an analysis of the effects of negative cases generated and presented in Studies 2 through 4. Study 6 further examines the extent to which participants reason about these categories This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
symmetrically when they are aware of the experimenter's rule to be discovered. I return to this issue again in the discussion of that study. Finally, the difficulty in noticing the Whiteness of White actors in the CGG was not unique to White people and so cannot be attributed to a motivated process of in-group projection (Wenzel et al., 2007) . White and non-White participants performed similarly in the White actors race-positive rule condition. In sum, the CGG was equally difficult for participants of all ethnicities when the game required them to notice that Whiteness is a feature that White actors share. This comparison of White and non-White participants was underpowered and will also be revisited in an analysis of the results of Studies 2 through 4.
Study 3: Replication and Clues to Structure
Studies 1 and 2 demonstrated that norms for the category "celebrity actors" inhibit the generation of hypotheses that specify the normative identity of Whiteness by making that Whiteness implicit. These novel findings demonstrate the mutual relevance of the social cognition of race and research on scientific reasoning. The results also suggest that scientific reasoning can habitually and unintentionally produce unequal outcomes in thinking about social groups that may lead to standard-setting around normative groups (Wenzel et al., 2003) , which have prompted reforms in sampling in the recent history of medical research (Epstein, 2007) and criticisms in psychology (e.g., Sue, 2004) . As such, Study 2 merits both tests of replication and exploration of the ways of intervening in thinking to render the discovery of the Whiteness of White celebrities more likely. These goals were pursued in Studies 3 and 4.
Study 3 tested the effectiveness of two analogical problems as cues to the structure of the White actors race-positive version of the CGG. The first intervention was to present an analogous problem that resembled the CGG in that the participants' initial hypothesis overlapped with the experimenter's rule (see Figure 1) . The names of the three White actors in Study 2 most often called to mind hypotheses about the acting profession. Eleven of the 30 participants in the easy White actors race-positive and racenegative conditions of that study directly stated the acting profession as their first hypothesis. Eight further participants directly stated a rule that assumed it as their first hypothesis (e.g., "All have won an Oscar"). This hypothesis and the experimenter's rule are logically overlapping because some celebrities are White actors, some White celebrities are not actors, and some actors are not White. In Klayman and Ha's (1989) South American cities problem, hypotheses and rules similarly overlap (see Figure 1) . The South American cities problem presents participants with three cities that suggest the rule South American cities which overlaps with the experimenter's less accessible rule "cities south of the equator." Participants in one condition of Study 3 completed the South American cities problem prior to the CGG.
The second intervention engaged participants in the surgeon riddle mentioned earlier (Reynolds et al., 2006) . The surgeon riddle and the CGG are analogous in that participants must have an insight that a category (e.g., surgeons, celebrity actors) has been implicitly constructed with a default normative identity of a high status group (e.g., men, Whites). Again, effects of this analogous problem on performance were assessed. Study 3 represents a hard test of the effects of analogical problem solving on performance as single experiences with analogous problems only rarely leads to a transference of learning (Holyoak, 2012) , As such evidence of analogical transfer here would constitute strong evidence that difficulty in the CGG is readily overcome.
Method
Participants. Study 2 found a large difference in success rates between the easy and difficult conditions. G power analysis showed that a three-condition experiment (df ϭ 2) requires a sample size of 62 if chi-square tests are to detect large effects (w ϭ .50), with an ␣ of .05 and power (1 Ϫ ␤) of .95. I set the sample size for Studies 3 and 4 at 60 (20 per condition). Fifty-three women and seven men studying psychology aged 18 to 52 years, participated in return for course credit (M age ϭ 20.53 years). Forty-seven participants identified as White, British, Caucasian. White British, White European, White Other. Two participants identified as Black African, and as Chinese. One each identified as Arab British, Arab Indian, Asian, Asian Pakistani, Black, British Asian, Cypriot, Indian British, and Moroccan.
Materials and procedure. All participants took part in the White actors race-positive rule condition of Study 2 using identical materials and an identical procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions. In the control condition participants only completed the CGG. In the South American cities condition, participants completed the cities problem prior to the CGG. Participants were presented with the names of three cities: Buenos Aires, Rio de Janeiro, and Santiago, and asked to specify the experimenter's rule that all three cities shared. Materials used the same landscape A4 format as the CGG, and participants in this condition completed the practice trial described in Study 2 prior to attempting the cities problem. As in the CGG, the South American cities problem concluded when the participant correctly guessed the rule "cities south of the equator," the participant made 15 incorrect guesses, or 20 min had elapsed. The first outcome was coded as success and the second and third outcomes were coded as failure. Participants who failed the South American cities problem were told the experimenter's rule. All participants then attempted the CGG as per the control condition.
Finally, participants assigned to the surgeon riddle condition first attempted the following version of the riddle prior to attempting the CGG.
This morning a man and his son were driving to work. They were driving along the highway when they had a terrible accident. The man was killed outright but the son was alive although badly injured. The son was rushed to the hospital and was to have an emergency operation. On entering the operating theater, the surgeon looked at the boy and said, "I can't do this operation. This boy is my son."
Participants were told to take as long as they wished to solve the riddle and were timed as they did so.
Participants completed an open-ended item "Describe as precisely as you can the relationship that the surgeon had with the boy who was badly injured." Participants who guessed that the surgeon was the boy's mother were deemed to have solved the surgeon riddle, and all others were deemed to have failed it. Participants who failed the riddle were provided with the correct answer. All participants then attempted the CGG as per the control condition. As in Study 2, participants in all This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
conditions were fully debriefed, and all agreed not to maintain confidentiality during debriefing.
Results
I first examined performance with the South American cities problem and the surgeon riddle. Participants spent an average of 14.27 min engaged in the South American cities problem (95% CI [14.27, 18.39] ) and made an average of 8.45 guesses (95% CI [6.83, 10.07] ). Nine of 20 participants solved the problem replicating the success rate observed by Klayman and Ha (1989) . Participants spent on average 2.59 min on the surgeon riddle (95% CI [2.06, 3.12]), and 9 of 20 participants solved it, replicating the success rate observed by Reynolds et al. (2006 The second goal of Study 3 was to assess the effectiveness of two clues to the structure of the CGG. Chi-square test demonstrated that success rates were similar across the three conditions, and one-way ANOVAs with experimental condition as an independent variable showed no difference in time, incorrect guesses and self-reported difficulty across conditions (see Table 2 ). Neither problem significant improved performance over control by any measure. Analogical transfer to the CGG did not occur.
Discussion
Study 3 replicated the difficulty of discovering a race-specific rule from observations of White celebrities shown in Study 2. A majority of participants again failed to discover the rule that all three actors were White. Neither the South American cities problem nor the surgeon riddle provided an effective clue to structure that improved performance. Trends toward lower performance in the South American cities problem may indicate an unintended consequence of fatigue, as experimental sessions in this condition were necessarily longer than those in the other conditions. Stronger clues to structure were investigated in Study 4.
Study 4: Replication and Clues to Structure
Study 4 aimed to replicate the findings in the key White-actors race-positive condition of Study 2 and tested the effects of two stronger interventions. The first intervention involved a stronger prompt to structure using the surgeon problem. Transfer between analogous problems requires participants to search back through memory for useful analogous experiences. As a result, transfer is more likely when participants are explicitly told that the problems that they are attempting to solve are analogous (Holyoak, 2012) . In the surgeon riddle condition of Study 4, participants attempted the riddle, were given a description of insight problems, were required to write out their understanding of what an insight problem was, and were briefed that the surgeon riddle and the celebrity guessing game were both insight problems. The second intervention was informed by Klayman and Ha's (1989) findings that negative tests provide critical feedback when the participant's hypothesis and the rule to be discovered overlap. Participants were presented with a negative case clue of a Black actor and the feedback that this actor does not fit the experimenter's rule midway through the CGG.
Method
Participants. Forty-five women and 15 men studying psychology aged 18 to 59 years participated in return for course credit (M age ϭ 20.37 years). Forty-six participants identified as British, British White, Caucasian, White, White (Caucasian), White (Eastern European), White British, White Other; 4 identified as Chinese, and 1 each identified as Asian, Asian Other, Asian British, Black British Caribbean, Black British, Hispanic, Indian, Middle Eastern, Mixed Caribbean, and Mixed African/Asian. Two participants were replaced to fill the design. One participant in the negative case clue condition guessed the correct rule prior to the intervention that constituted the experimental manipulation in this condition, and one revealed that they were not naïve to the hypothesis at debriefing.
Materials and procedure. Participants' sessions were advertised and scheduled as in Studies 2 and 3. Eighteen participants were each randomly assigned to one of three conditions. Those in the control condition completed the CGG as per the White actors race-positive rule condition of Study 2.
Participants in the surgeon riddle condition first attempted the surgeon riddle as in Study 3 (see Appendix 1). Next, participants were presented with the following script that emphasized the nature of insight problem solving:
Many thanks for taking part in the first part of the experiment in which you were presented with the "surgeon riddle." The answer to this riddle is that the surgeon is the boy's mother.
In past experiments at University of Surrey and elsewhere, about 50% of people correctly guess that the surgeon is the boy's mother. Another 50% of people come up with other explanations such as the idea that the original "father" is a priest, that the boy has an adoptive and a biological father, or that the boy has two gay dads. Do not worry if you didn't get the right answer, you are in good company! Often when people see the answer to the surgeon riddle, they say "Of course, how obvious"! The riddle tricks people because we often spontaneously bring to mind an image of a man when we imagine a surgeon at work. That image blocks our insight that the surgeon could be a woman, making it less obvious than it seems that the surgeon could be the boy's mother. In other words, the surgeon riddle is an insight problem; the first thought that comes to mind throws your thinking on the wrong track, and you have to have an "insight" to find the right way of thinking about the problem to solve it. Do you understand what I mean? This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
The celebrity guessing game is also an "insight" problem. By this I mean that in the celebrity guessing game, your first guess may not be on the right track and you may need to have an "insight" to solve the problem. After you have found the solution, you may think "Of course, that was obvious" even though the solution is actually hard to find.
OK, you are ready for the practice trial for the celebrity guessing game now. Before you go on to it, write down, in your own words, your understanding of what makes a problem an "insight problem" in the lines below.
The instructions were followed by five blank lines. After completing their description of an insight problem, participants continued with the CGG as per the control condition. In the final negative case clue condition, participants began the CGG as per the control condition. In this condition, once a participant made three incorrect guesses, the participant was interrupted by the experimenter. The experimenter told the participant that they would now be given a clue. The experimenter then wrote the name of the actor "Eddie Murphy" on the A4 sheet and marked it with a cross to indicate that this celebrity actor did not fit the experimenter's rule. Participants then continued with the CGG as per the control condition. As in earlier studies, all Study 4 participants were debriefed, and all agreed not to disclose details of the study to classmates during debriefing.
Results
Seven of 20 participants solved the riddle, and spent on average 2.37 min doing so. I next examined the central hypothesis by examining participants' performance across condition. As Table 3 illustrates, failure rates varied significantly across the three conditions. Participants who received a negative case clue were more likely to succeed than participants in either the control condition, 2 (2, N ϭ 40) ϭ 8.64, p ϭ .003, or those in the surgeon clue condition, 2 (2, N ϭ 40) ϭ 5.58, p ϭ .02, whereas performance in these latter two conditions did not differ, 2 Ͻ 1. One-way ANOVA tests of differences also confirmed that participants were more successful in the negative clue condition than in the control condition by all measures of difficulty, whereas participants were equally successful in the surgeon riddle and control conditions by all measures (see Table 3 ). In sum, the negative case clue improved performance in the CGG while the surgeon riddle did not.
Discussion
Study 4 provided further confirmation of the category norm hypothesis both by replicating the difficulty of discovering that White people are White, and by showing that information about a Black actor facilitated successful discovery of that rule. The effect of this negative case clue is consistent with the finding in the Black actors race-negative condition of Study 2. There, participants typically succeeded in discovering that none of those actors were White. It further suggests that categories that specify White people can be made available as contrast classes from the information that Black celebrities do not belong to those categories (Gale & Ball, 2006 , 2012 Oaksford, 2002) . However, the surgeon riddle had no effect on performance, even though it was accompanied by a direct clue that the CGG was an insight problem that resembled it.
Analysis of Studies 2 through 4: Effects of identity and negative cases. Studies 2 through 4 were designed to test for large effects. Jointly the studies included 210 participants and had sufficient statistical power to test two additional hypothesis concerning the effect of participants' ethnic identity and participants self-generated negative cases on performance in the CGG. These questions were examined in the following text.
As noted previously, the tendency to fail the CGG could be more common among Whites if Whites are prone to overgeneralizing from their own ethnic group (Wenzel et al., 2003) . I compared the performance of 99 White and 31 non-White participants from the difficult conditions of Study 2 (n ϭ 30), all conditions of Study 3 (n ϭ 60), and the control and surgeon riddle conditions of Study 4 (n ϭ 40) who all attempted the CGG without being presented with negative case clues by the experimenters. Participants in either the easy Black actors race-negative and racepositive conditions of Study 2 (n ϭ 20) or in the negative case clue Note. Means within a row that do not share a superscript differ (Tukey's HSD, ␣ ϭ .05). This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
condition of Study 4 (n ϭ 20) were not considered in this analysis. Failure rates were similar for White and non-White participants (59.6% vs. 51.6%) 2 (1, N ϭ 130) ϭ 0.61, p ϭ .43, corroborating the earlier conclusions based on Study 2 results and suggesting that the CGG was difficult for all participants and not particularly for White participants. Over and above the tendency to construct standards around in-groups (Wenzel et al., 2003) , White participants may have less interest and knowledge in non-White celebrities than their non-White counterparts do. In support of this interpretation, a small but significant difference was found such that non-White participants generated more negative case clues than did White participants, (64.5% vs. 44.4%), 2 (1, N ϭ 130) ϭ 3.81, p ϭ .05.
As Hilton (1990) has argued, participants in reasoning experiments not only consider the stimuli presented to them as data, but also make inferences about the range of situations that the experimenter might have created that is informed both by conversational pragmatics and the information presented. By presenting negative cases (i.e., Black actors' names) in Studies 2 and 4, experimenters could have both provided participants with informative feedback and changed participants' assumptions about what the experimental situation could be about. Accordingly, it is important to determine that negative cases lead the participants to figure out that the rule was about race even when those Black actors' names were not introduced by the experimenter. I divided the participants in Studies 2 through 4 into three groups. The first group were given the names of one or more Black actors by the experimenter, and included participants in the Black actors race-negative and racepositive conditions of Study 2 (n ϭ 20) and the negative case clue condition of Study 4 (n ϭ 20). The remaining participants in these three experiments were not provided with negative case clues, but often generated their own. These participants were subdivided according to whether or not they generated negative case clues. As Table 4 shows, failure and success rates varied significantly among these three groups, 2 (2, N ϭ 170) ϭ 43.71, p Ͻ .001. Among those who were not provided with a negative case clue, participants who generated such a clue failed the CGG far less often than those who did not, 2 (1, N ϭ 130) ϭ 19.72, p Ͻ .001. This finding is consistent with a large body of findings showing that negative case clues facilitated success when participants generate them (e.g., Wason, 1960) . However, it is also possible that discursive factors enhanced the difference between conditions. Participants who generated a negative case clue failed the CGG significantly more often than participants provided such clues by the experimenters, 2 (1, N ϭ 104) ϭ 7.59, p Ͻ .001, allowing a possible influence of conversational pragmatics, such as the more natural negation of the presupposition that actors are White than that actors are Black (see Horn, 2001 ). However, other differences between these two groups of participants might also account for this difference and should temper such conclusions. Participants who generated negative case clues did so some way into the experiment, and consequently had less remaining time to use this information than participants given such clues at the outset (Study 2) or after their third guess (Study 4). This factor may have also led to differences in performance.
In sum, Studies 2 through 4 provided repeated confirmation of the difficulty of noticing that White people are White in the CGG, and the effect of negative cases in facilitating success. Both the effect of the negative case clues and the failure of the analogous problems to impact performance raises the question of whether participants' appropriately value the information that a person needs to succeed in the CGG. Study 5 examined the impact of interventions to manipulate the salience of White actors' Whiteness by changing the value of the information about race in White and Black actors names. Study 6 adapted and expanded Kareev and Halberstadt's (1993) method to assess if participants could accurately perceive the information that negative case clues could provide.
Study 5: Manipulating the Salience of Actors' Race
Thus far, I have attributed difficulty in the CGG to the influence of category norms on participants' thinking. Study 5 examines the extent to which these norms and the different salience of Black and White actors can be attributed to the greater distinctiveness of Black actors' race by virtue of their presumed rarity among film actors (Cherubini et al., 2005) . Most lead actors in Hollywood films are White (Smith et al., 2016) . I assume here that participants share the belief that a higher proportion of film actors are White than are Black. Study 5 manipulated the distinctiveness of White and Black actors' race and observed effects on the salience of Black and White actors' race.
As in Pratto, Hegarty, and Korchmaros (2007, Experiment 1) , Study 5 examined the extent to which race comes to mind spontaneously when participants are asked to list typical and atypical features of celebrities. participants considered celebrities whose race or gender rendered them normative or non-normative within a celebrity category. About 40% of participants mentioned race or gender in specifying what made a non-normative celebrity atypical. But only 10% mentioned race or gender in specifying what made a nonnormative celebrity atypical or what made a normative celebrity typical or atypical. In Study 5, participants saw the names of four film stars' names and were asked to list their typical or atypical features. The distinctiveness of celebrities' race was manipulated both by altering the majority racial group within the set of four, and participants were provided with different comparative instructions that made that set of four actors either more or less relevant. As I did earlier, I predicted that the race of Black actors would be referenced more than that of White actors overall. Following I predicted that participants would particularly mention Blackness as a reason that actors were atypical rather than typical of film actors as a group. I tested whether changing the distinctiveness of race would impact the salience of Black and White actors' race. Distinctiveness was This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
manipulated by changing the racial make-up of the stimulus set, and by both allowing and explicitly demanding that participants use that stimulus set as a basis for considering typicality and atypicality.
Method
Participants. The participants were 430 Mechanical Turk workers. Twenty responses were excluded because they were nonsensical letter or number strings or had plagiarized extensive information about the film stars from other Internet sources. Analysis conducted on the remaining 410 participants, who included 215 women, 193 men, 1 participant who identified with a nonbinary gender and one who did not report gender. Age varied from 18 to 71 years (M ϭ 35.30 years).
Materials and procedure. This study had a 2 ϫ 2 ϫ 3 design. Participants were recruited to complete the celebrity general knowledge task and were presented with the names of four actors. Among these, a majority were Black but one was White (Morgan Freeman, Halle Berry, Jim Carrey, and Eddie Murphy) or a majority were White but one was Black (Colin Firth, Kate Winslet, Eddie Murphy, and Jim Carrey). Within these sets, the race of the majority group was a less distinct feature than the race of the actor who was the sole representative of his race. Participants were asked to list up to three typical or atypical features of each of the four actors under one of three comparative instructions conditions.
The comparative instructions were designed to manipulate the extent to which participants used the stimulus set as a point of comparison when calling the actors' typical and atypical attributes to mind. On the first screen of the category norm condition, participants were told that actors' names would be presented sequentially on separate screens and they were instructed as follows:
Below are the names of four well-known Hollywood actors. Underneath each film star's name please write up to three things about that person that make them [typical/atypical] Each actor's name was displayed sequentially on a separate screen with a response box for open-ended responses. In the remaining two conditions the names of the four actors were presented on the same screen, with a response box for open-ended responses directly below each name. In the free norm condition, participants were instructed as follows.
Below are the names of four well-known Hollywood actors. Underneath each film star's name please write up to three things that you know about that person that make them [typical/atypical].
In the stimulus set norm condition, participants were instructed as follows:
Below we have grouped together the names of four well-known Hollywood actors. Underneath each film star's name please write up to three things about that person that make them a [typical/atypical] film star within this particular group of four actors. In other words, below each name list facts that makes each person [similar to/different from] most or all of the other three people in the group who are named below.
Participants were debriefed that the study concerned the kinds of traits and identities that people spontaneously call to mind when thinking about famous celebrities and were compensated for their time.
Results
All responses were coded for the presence (coded as 1) or absence (coded as 0) of mention of the celebrity's race. The proportion of participants who mentioned each individual celebrity's race are shown in Table 5 . I analyzed the data with four 2 ϫ 2 ϫ 3 ANOVAs, each of which examined the mention of race in regard to one of the four actors in sequence. Majority race (Black vs. White), features listed (typical vs. atypical), and comparison instructions (category norm vs. free norm vs. stimulus set norm) were treated as between-subjects independent variables, and mention of race was the dependent variable.
These analyses consistently revealed large main effects of the actors' identity on the frequency with which the race was mentioned in regard to the three actors who constituted the majority racial group within each set. In sum, for actors who were among the majority in the stimulus set, the race of Black actors was always more salient than the race of White actors, and neither manipulations of the distinctiveness of Black and White actors' race within the stimulus set nor the comparative instructions affected that large difference in salience. Changes to the distinctiveness of Whiteness and Blackness did little to affect the salience of majority actor's race.
In contrast, the manipulations did moderate the minority actor's race. When presented as the distinct minority, Murphy's race was mentioned by many more participants than was Carrey's (20.2% vs. 4.6%), F(1, 398) ϭ 25.63, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .06, consistent with the more common mention of Black actors' race in the study as a whole. A main effect of norm condition was also evident, F(1, 398) ϭ 3.92, p ϭ .02, p 2 ϭ .02. These two main effects interacted, F(1, 398) ϭ 4.44, p ϭ .01, p 2 ϭ .02. The ANOVA also revealed a two way interaction between actor race and the type of features listed, F(1, 398) ϭ 13.73, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .07, and a three-way interaction involving all independent variables, F(1, 398) ϭ 9.47, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .05. These interactions are most clearly described by considering the effects of the manipulation of majority group and comparative instructions on the salience of Carrey and Murphy's race separately, using 2 ϫ 3 ANOVAs. These analyses first showed that the experimental manipulations had no significant main effects nor interacted to affect the salience of Carrey's Whiteness, which was mentioned by only 2% to 9% of participants across conditions (all p Ͼ .05). In other words, rendering this White actor the statistical minority in the stimulus set, making the stimulus set available as a basis for contrast and even asking participants to refer to it directly, did not render his Whiteness significantly more salient. Rather, the three-way interaction was due to a main effects of comparative instructions on mention of This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
Eddie Murphy's race, F(1, 174) ϭ 4.31, p ϭ .02, p 2 ϭ .05, and a significant interaction between comparative instructions and feature listed, F(1, 174) ϭ 13.11, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .13. In the category norm condition, more participants listed Murphy's race as one of his atypical than typical features, consistent with . In the free comparison condition, more participants listed his race as a typical than an atypical feature, and when explicitly asked to compare him to the other three White actors, participants rarely listed his race as either a typical or atypical feature (see Table 4 ).
Study 5 also allowed a test of the degree to which the salience of actors' race was moderated by participants' race, as 249 participants identified as White (coded as 1) and 161 did not (coded as 0). Adding participant race as an additional factor to the ANOVAs described in preceding text yielded consistent main effects of participant race. People who identified themselves as White mentioned the actors race more often than those who did not in regard to the first actor (Ms ϭ 17.6 vs. 6.2%) , F(1, 386) The same participant groups did not differ in the frequency with which they mentioned the race of Colin Firth (0.0% vs. 3.5%), Kate Winslet (1.6% vs. 2.6%), or Jim Carrey (1.6% vs. 1.7%). In other words, White people more often mentioned the race of Black actors, but White and non-White participants similarly mention the race of White actors rarely in Study 5.
Discussion
In Study 5, the distinctiveness of White and Black actors was manipulated and the presence of race among the typical and atypical features of film stars was observed under instructions to make different comparisons. The tendency to notice the race of Black actors more than White actors was strong. White actors' race was rarely mentioned, even when a White actor was the only one in the group and participants were asked to specifically state what made him unusual within the group. In contrast references to the race of Black actors were common across conditions.
The effects of the conditions on the salience of the lone Black actor's race in the White majority group do not suggest that the norm theory interpretation of the CGG give greater importance to statistically distinctive features in determining salience. Indeed, Murphy's race was least often mentioned in the condition where participants were demanded to compare him with three White actors. Similarly, it is not easy to see why, for informatic reasons, participants would use race to describe Murphy as typical rather than atypical when three White actors were made available as an implicit background for comparison. I conjecture that these unexpected shifts in mentioning this actor's race may have less to do with a reduction in the salience of Murphy's race than with reticence to mention race at all in these conditions. When demanded to describe how a Black actor differs from three White Note. Carrey and Murphy constituted the sole actor of their race in Position 3 and were part of the majority racial group when in Position 4.
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actors, participants may have been more reticent to mention race (Apfelbaum et al., 2008) . These results also argue against a discursive interpretation of the CGG results reported above (Hilton, 1990; Horn, 2001 ). In contrast to , the preference to note race as an atypical rather than a typical feature of Black actors was limited to a small number of conditions. Rather, all participants, but particularly White participants, frequently mentioned race a propos of Black actors, whether they were asked to report atypical or typical features. This finding argues against the assumption that people consider Blackness to be an atypical feature of film stars. Rather it seems that Blackness is something that is readily marked across contexts.
Study 6: Strategies to Help and Hinder Success in the Celebrity Guessing Game
Study 5 suggests that increasing the distinctiveness of White actors' race does not readily increase its salience. Study 6 further examines the reasons for difficulty in the CGG by examining participants' insight into the information provided by positive and negative clues. In Study 6, participants generated a celebrity's name on behalf of a hypothetical person playing the CGG. The vignettes described an experimenter with a race-specific rule about Black or White celebrities and a "guesser" who held in mind a hypothesis about the category actors informed by earlier guesses of several actors who all matched the race specified by the experimenter's rule. These vignettes resembled Kareev and Halberstadt's (1993) study in which participants imagined a guesser who had generated only positive tests, and were additionally made aware of the experimenter's rule that that guesser had to discover. Their participants correctly perceived that negative tests were informative under those conditions. Study 5 similarly assessed participants' insight into the value of positive and negative tests in the CGG.
Study 6 included an additional manipulation that Kareev and Halberstadt (1993) did not consider. Participants also imagined that the guesser did not know that they, the participant, knew the experimenter's rule. This crucial fact allowed participants to generate guesses that would help or sneakily hinder the guesser's progress, and participants' goals were manipulated accordingly. This manipulation of both the experimenter's rule (Black celebrities vs. White celebrities) and the participants' goal (to help vs. hinder the guesser) allows multiple tests of participants' insight into the CGG by examining the clues that participants generated, their estimates of the effects of those clues on the guesser, and the salience of race and acting in their thinking as they generated these clues. The celebrity names that participants generated were coded as raceϩ or raceϪ according to whether or not the name matched the experimenter's race-specific rule or not, and as actorϩ or actorϪ according to whether or not the celebrity was an actor or not. Guesses were of four different types. For example, a participant in the White actors condition could generate a raceϩ/actorϩ guess (e.g., Al Pacino) a raceϩ/actorϪ guess (e.g., Hillary Clinton), a raceϪ/actor ϩ guess (e.g., Oprah Winfrey) or a raceϪ/ actorϪ guess (e.g., John Coltrane). Following Klayman and Ha's (1987) study, I conceptualized both raceϩ/actorϪ and raceϪ/ actorϩ clues as helpful clues, as generating such clues would force the experimenter to reveal an area of mismatch between the guesser's hypothesis and their own overlapping rule. In contrast, raceϩ/actorϩ clues fit both hypothesis and rule, whereas race-/ actor-clues fit neither hypothesis nor rule and would yield ambiguous feedback. Both types of clues are described subsequently as hindering clues.
The distribution of clues across the four conditions informs conclusions about the participants' insight into their value. Three competing hypotheses were considered. First consider that reliance on positive tests is a habitual strategy in hypothesis generation tasks (Evans, 2007) . Such a positivity bias (Evans, 1989) could be shown by the generation of more raceϩ than raceϪ clues and more actorϩ than actorϪ clues across all conditions. Second, if participants have complete insight into the clues' value, then they should generate more raceϪ/actorϩ and raceϩ/actorϪ tests to help the guesser, and more raceϩ/actorϩ and actorϪ/raceϪ tests to hinder the guesser. Third, participants might show a race-sensitive understanding of the clues' value. Study 6 is the only study in which participants have access to the rule-to-be-discovered. Recall that different competing hypotheses can be drawn from the literature on negation and contrast classes as to whether the clue that a Black celebrity does not fit the rule would suggest that contrast class White celebrities more or less than that a clue that a White celebrity does not fit the rule would suggest that contrast class Black celebrities. Study 6 allows a test of the extent to which participants' uses of such negative clues is symmetric or asymmetric around the category of race.
Method
Participants. Participants completed the materials as a filler task in an unrelated study on person memory and impression formation. One hundred 21 women, 94 men, and 1 participant who did not disclose their gender successfully completed the manipulation check (described subsequently) and were included in the analysis (age range ϭ 16 -59 years, M ϭ 22.06 years). Most participants identified as Caucasian or White (n ϭ 173). Thirteen participants identified as Black; 5 as Mixed Race; 4 each as Asian, British, and Indian; 2 each as Cypriot and Greek; and 1 each as Caribbean, Filipino, Sri Lankan, and Tamil.
Materials. Participants were presented with a vignette describing two people playing the CGG. In all four conditions of the experiment, the first two paragraphs of the description were identical.
Imagine that you are playing a competitive guessing game called "The Celebrity Guessing Game" among some friends. In this game, one person-the rule-maker-thinks of a rule; and the rule defines something that only some people have in common. For example, the rule might be "all of these people competed in the Olympics," or "all of these people are Americans," or "all of these people have red hair," or something like that.
The other person in the game is the guesser, and his or her task is to try to guess what the rule is that the rule-maker has in mind. In each turn of the game, the guesser announces the name of a famous person and guesses what they think the rule might be. The rule-maker then tells the guesser whether the famous person that they have mentioned obeys the rule or not. The rule-maker also tells the guesser if they have guessed the rule correctly or not. If the guesser guesses the rule correctly, then the guesser wins the game (and a prize)! If the This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
rule-maker can think of a rule that is so difficult that the guesser doesn't guess it even after 15 guesses or 20 min, then the rule-maker wins the game and the prize.
The third paragraph varied actor race to be either Black or White:
You are watching two friends play this game. You have sneaked a peak at the rule-maker's rule and so you know that their rule is "all of these people are [Black/White] ." So far in this game, the guesser has given three names [Eddie Murphy, Halle Berry and Morgan Freeman/ Jim Carrey, Kate Winslet, and Colin Firth] . As all of these celebrities are [Black/White] the rule-maker has told the guesser, on each occasion, that each celebrity does obey their rule. The guesser has guessed three rules: "all of these people are film stars," "all of these people are actors," and "all of these people go to the Oscars." Of course, none of these are the rule that the rule-maker has in mind.
The last paragraph instructed participants to intervene either to help or hinder the guesser:
The guesser is scratching their head, and says to you "why don't you guess a name?" As you secretly know that the rule-maker has chosen the rule "all of these people are [Black/ White]" you have an opportunity to cheat. You decide to use this opportunity on behalf of [the guesser/the rule-maker] by guessing a name that you think will help [the guesser/the rule-maker] to win the game.
Participants completed several dependent variables. First four manipulation checks items ensured that participants understood the rule-maker and clue-giver's goals and the guesser's behavior:
What is the rule-maker's rule?
What is the guesser trying to do?
List one rule that the guesser has already guessed.
List one celebrity that the guesser has already guessed.
Next, participants were asked how they would intervene in the game. The first item elicited the primary dependent measure by asking the participant to generate a clue to help or hinder the guesser: Participants then completed two items reporting the perceived likelihood of the guesser's success with and without their intervention.
Without my clue, there is a % chance that the guesser will solve the problem.
With my clue, there is a % chance that the guesser will solve the problem.
Demographic items were presented last.
Procedure. Participants were randomly allocated to condition, and all experimenters were unaware of the purpose and design of the study.
Coding. I coded the clues generated by the participants as raceϩ or raceϪ and as actorϩ or actorϪ. Participants' own explanations of their guesses allowed greater insight into participants' constructions of race, which informed the coding in a few cases. Barack Obama's name was generated as a clue by 20 participants, and 19 of these clues were coded either as raceϩ or actorϪ clues in the Black exemplars conditions, or as raceϪ or actorϪ clues in the White exemplars condition. However, one participant in a Black exemplars condition suggested Barack Obama because "different ethnicity, so the rule would not apply to Barack Obama." This participant's guess was coded as raceϪ/actorϪ. Second, the coding scheme required that celebrity race remain stable. This requirement made Michael Jackson's race a special case. Six participants generated Michael Jackson's name as a clue, and five of their explanations indicated that Michael Jackson had changed race (e.g., "He famously became White," "He became White after being Black"). I excluded all 6 participants from analyses.
Results
Participant exclusion. Of the 293 participants, 83 failed one (n ϭ 57) or more (n ϭ 20) manipulation check items or generated Michael Jackson's name as a clue (n ϭ 6). Analysis of the data from the remaining 210 participants follows.
Clues generated. Table 6 shows the number and percentage of participants in each condition who generated each type of clue. I analyzed the distribution of clues across the experimental conditions using log-linear analysis, first considering a saturated model involving the independent variables of actor race (Black vs. White), strategy (help vs. hinder), and the dependent variables of the clue's race (raceϩ vs. raceϪ) and actor status (actorϩ vs. actorϪ). The four-way interaction term in the fully saturated model was not significant (Z ϭ 1.09, p ϭ .28), and so I next considered the model that included the three-way interactions and lower order effects. This model represented a good fit to the data,
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(1, N ϭ 210) ϭ 1.42, p ϭ .23, and include a marginally significant three-way interaction described below. As this contingency informed one of the study's principal hypotheses, I interpreted this model.
There were two significant main effects within this model. Both effects evidenced an overall positivity bias (Evans, 1989) . Participants produced more raceϩ than raceϪ clues overall (143 vs. 67 clues, 68.1% vs. 31.9%; Z ϭ 2.52, p ϭ .01), and more actorϩ than actorϪ clues overall (135 vs. 75 clues, 64.3% vs. 35.7%; Z ϭ 2.80, p ϭ .005). A marginally significant contingency between these two factors was observed (Z ϭ 1.84, p ϭ .07). There were very few raceϪ/actorϪ clues generated in the experiment (n ϭ 11, 5.2%), whereas raceϩ/actorϩ, raceϩ/actorϪ, and actorϪ/raceϩ clues were all generated more commonly (n ϭ 79, 64, 56, respectively, 37.6%, 30.5%, 26.7% of responses, respectively) . RaceϪ/ actorϪ clues may have been rare because the task made film stars the most available kinds of celebrity that could be drawn to mind.
In addition to these positivity biases, there was one clearly significant two-way contingency in the model, involving the instruction to help or hinder the guesser and the clue's status, as actorϪ of actorϩ (Z ϭ 2.77, p ϭ .006). More participants produced actorϪ clues to help the guesser than to hinder the guesser This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
(54 vs. 21 clues or 54.5% vs. 18.9% of clues), and almost all of these were helpful raceϩ/actorϪ clues (i.e., 64 of 75 clues, 85.3%, see Table 5 ). Participants produced these helpful raceϩ/actorϪ clues far more commonly to help the guesser (48 of 99 clues, 48.5%) than to hinder the guesser (16 of 101 clues, 15.8%). This two-way contingency was highly significant, 2 (1, N ϭ 210) ϭ 12.26, p ϭ 4.63 Ϫ4 , and indicates that participants understood the value of these helpful raceϩ/actorϪ clues.
Participants also produced more actorϩ clues to hinder the guesser than to help the guesser (90 vs. 45 clues or 81.1% vs. 45.5%). Participants produced more of the hindering raceϩ/actorϩ clues to hinder the guesser (47.3% or 52 of 110 guesses) than to help the guesser (27.3% or 27 of 99 guesses). This difference was highly significant, 2 (1, N ϭ 210) ϭ 8.03, p ϭ .005, and indicates understanding of the value of these hindering raceϩ/ actorϩ clues. However, the helpful raceϪ/actorϩ clues were also generated far more often when attempting to hinder the guesser (38 of 111 clues, 36.2%) than to help the guesser (18 of 99 clues, 18.2%), 2 (1, N ϭ 210) ϭ 6.90, p ϭ .008. Participants appeared to lack the insight that these raceϪ/actorϩ clues, shown to facilitate success in Studies 2 through 4 above, would help rather than hinder the guesser. In sum, the distribution of participants' clues across the helping and hindering conditions demonstrated far greater insight in the value of raceϩ clues (both actorϩ and actorϪ) than the value of raceϪ clues (both actorϩ and actorϪ).
Two other marginally significant contingencies were observed. The first was a two-way contingency between the independent variables of the goal manipulation and celebrity race (Z ϭ 1.84, p ϭ .065). This contingency was moderated by a marginal threeway interaction between these two independent variables and the race of participants' clues (Z ϭ 1.68, p ϭ .09). Although a weak effect, this three-way contingency was examined because it constituted the only evidence that participants' clue-giving strategies might have been asymmetric around the category of race. In the White actors condition, participants produced raceϩ clues and raceϪ clues in roughly equal proportions when they aimed to help the guesser (32 vs. 15 clues) and to hinder the guesser (38 vs. 20 clues). The two-way contingency between goal condition and the clue type generated was not significant in the White actors conditions, 2 (1, N ϭ 105) ϭ 0.08, p ϭ .78. However, in the Black actors condition, participants produced a greater proportion of raceϩ clues than raceϪ clues when helping the guesser (42 vs. 9 clues) and an equal proportion of raceϩ and raceϪ clues when hindering the guesser (30 vs. 23 clues). The two-way contingency between goal condition and the clue type generated was significant in the Black actors condition, 2 (1, N ϭ 105) ϭ 8.43, p ϭ .003. Only in the Black actors condition did participants generate proportionately more Black actor clues to help the guesser. This finding suggests that participants considered that the names of Black celebrities might have signaled the contrast class White celebrities more readily than the names of White celebrities signaled the contrast class Black celebrities. However, the statistical evidence for a distinct use of Black actors' names to help the guess in the Black actors helping goal condition is weak. When broken down according to distribution of raceϩ and raceϪ generated across the Black and White actors conditions, there are no significant differences according to whether the participants were aiming to help the guesser, 2 (1, N ϭ 99) ϭ 1.98, p ϭ .15, or to hinder the guesser, 2 (1, N ϭ 111) ϭ 0.59, p ϭ .07. Taken together, the distribution of clues across helping and hindering conditions shows some support for all three competing hypotheses. First, showing a positivity bias, raceϩ and actorϩ tests were more common than raceϪ and actorϪ tests. Second, participants had insight into raceϩ clues' value, producing raceϩ/ actorϩ more often to hinder the guesser and raceϩ/actorϪ clues more often to help the guesser. However, participants appeared to lack insight into the value of raceϪ clues, unlike Kareev and Halberstadt's (1993) participants. RaceϪ/actorϩ clues, which are logically helpful were produced more often to hinder than to help the guesser, whereas hindering raceϪ/actorϪ clues were hardly ever produced. Finally, there was very little evidence that participants used their understanding of category norms to generate their guesses, and such evidence was limited to the Black actors condition. I next turn to participants' estimates of the guessers' success to develop this description of their insight into the task further.
Likelihood of guesser's success. Three participants did not complete the items indicating the likelihood of the guesser's success with and without their clue, and I conducted a 2 ϫ 2 ϫ 2 ANOVA on the remaining 207 participants' estimates. This analysis included actor race (Black vs. White) and the participant's Tukey's post hoc tests showed that participants aiming to help the guesser estimated that the guesser would be significantly more likely to win the game with their intervention than without it (Ms ϭ 60.0%, 41.9%, respectively). However, participants aiming to hinder their guesser estimated that the guesser would be equally likely to success with or without their intervention (Ms ϭ 47.8%, 51.8%, respectively). No other main effects or interactions were significant (all F Ͻ 1, all p Ͼ .75, all p 2 Ͻ .001). In sum, participants correctly perceived that the CGG was more difficult when the actors were White than when they were Black but thought their helping clues would be equally effective and their hindering clues equally ineffective irrespective of the actors' race.
These estimates of the guesser's success were also used to examine which participants considered their clues to be effectively helpful or hindering. Table 6 displays the change in the guesser's predicted likelihood of success as a result of the participants' intervention by experimental condition and clue type. One-tailed t tests, pitted against a null hypothesis of zero change indicate which participants considered their strategies effective. Participants who tried to help the guesser and who generated helpful raceϪ/actorϩ clues and raceϩ/actorϪ clues believed that their clues would significantly improve the guesser's chance of success. Among the participants who attempted to hinder the guesser, only those who generated raceϪ/actorϩ clues believed that they had effectively generated hindering clues. Again, this finding suggests a lack of insight into the value of raceϪ/actorϩ clues.
Participants' rationales for their clues. Finally, Table 6 reports the frequency with which participants mentioned the category of race and the category of acting in their rationales that they offered for their clues. Two findings are significant here. First, across the experiment as a whole, significantly more participants mentioned race than mentioned the acting profession in their rationale (130 vs. 94, 61.9% vs. 44 .8%) and this difference was significant, 2 (1, N ϭ 210) ϭ 11.72, p Ͻ .001, ϭ .23. Second, as inspection of Table 5 shows, neither race nor acting was not more salient according to whether participants were in the White or Black actors conditions. This null effect further suggests little translation of the awareness that the guesser's task was more difficult when the celebrities were White into cognition about race-specific clue-generating strategies.
Discussion
In Study 6, participants imagined generating celebrity names to help or to hinder a person playing the CGG. Participants' realized that the guesser's task was more difficult when the experimenter's rule was about White people but failed to translate that insight into effective race-specific clue-giving strategies. When producing guesses that matched the race of the experimenter's rule, participants produced helping and hindering guesses strategically across conditions. Guesses that did not match the race of the experimenter's rule showed no obvious insight into the clues' value. participants produced helpful actorϩ/raceϪ clues to hinder the guesser, and rated these clues as particularly effective. Moreover, participants judged that the actorϩ/raceϪ would be particularly effective hindering clues. This result contrasts with Kareev and Halberstadt's (1993) findings that participants understood the value of positive and negative tests in the 2-4 -6 task. The lack of insight shown here may also explain why analogical problems did not facilitate success in earlier studies. Awareness of the difficulty of the White actors race-specific CGG does not readily translate into effective strategies for generating negative tests. The results of all six studies are discussed in the following section.
General Discussion
Implicitly normative features of social categories, such as the Whiteness of film actors, can have clear effects on the direction of hypothesis generation and test about the commonalities that people might share. As Whiteness falls within the category norm for film stars (Study 1), people rarely spontaneously call it to mind from observations of White actors alone. This difficulty is not due simply to a reticence to talk about race, White people's status as a statistical majority, or a tendency to overproject from in-groups among White people (Study 2). Rather, the difficulty follows from the failure to notice that White people are White. Corroborating this conclusion, information about non-White exemplars or negative tests cues race-specific hypotheses reliably in the CGG, whether such exemplars are generated by the participant themselves or are given by the experimenter (Studies 2 through 4). Intervening to change this habit of thought is not easy. The discovery that White people are White is not helped by analogous problems (Studies 3 and 4) or changing the informatic environment (Study 5). Participants understood that discovering a racespecific rule about White people would be more difficult than discovering than a rule about Black people in the CGG. But generated clues in a color-blind fashion and particularly failed to notice the value of negative tests nonetheless (Study 6).
These studies demonstrate the impact of social domain-specific knowledge on hypothesis generation and test. Klahr and Dunbar (1988) noted that studies of scientific thinking tended to separate out analysis of domain-specific knowledge from analysis of scientific thinking processes. The CGG expands studies of hypothesis generation and test to reasoning about social categories. Previous methods for studying the influence of category norms on higher reasoning, such as the surgeon riddle (Reynolds et al., 2006) , are limited to very particular contexts. The CGG is a much more flexible tool that allows a wider range of tests of when category norms affect perceptions of what features of exemplars seem most relevant when one is thinking scientifically.
From the perspective of the Wason task literature, hypotheses about race might seem inaccessible from data about White people primarily because Whites are a statistical majority (Cherubini et al., 2005; Klayman & Ha, 1987) . All other things being equal, This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
statistical majority groups are more likely to be taken as default values in category norms (Hegarty & Bruckmüller, 2013) . But, the difficulty in the CGG is not simply attributable to the fact that Whites are a less distinct group by virtue of being a statistical majority. Participants could discover hypotheses about statistical majorities, and discovered the hypotheses that specified Whiteness from information about Black celebrities whose names they generated themselves or were generated by the experimenter (Studies 2 through 4). Distinctiveness was not a limit condition to the failure to notice the Whiteness of White actors. Even when White actors were distinct and their distinctiveness was relevant to the question at hand, their Whiteness was only rarely their most salient feature (Study 5) The construction of Whiteness as a contrast case in response to a negative case clue may be influenced by discursive pragmatics (Hilton, 1990; Horn, 2001 ). However, three findings argue against the possibility that difficulty in the CGG is simply discursive. First, participants effectively used the negative case clues that they generate themselves in addition to those provided by the experimenter (Studies 2 through 4). Second, Blackness was readily available as a feature that explains why Black actors can be either typical or atypical among film stars (Study 5). In spite of this, Blackness was more consistently marked than consistently assumed to be unusual among film stars. Third, when provided with an opportunity to contribute to discourse in ways that would be informative in Study 6, participants resulting clues were largely symmetrical with regard to the category of race. Indeed, Kahneman and Miller's (1986) construct of the category norm and Oaksford's (2002) contrast case share the characteristics of representing implicit assumptions, prompted by discourse, whose contests are influenced by real-world knowledge. However, my conclusion that White actors was an available contrast case in response to feedback that one or more Black actors did not fit the rule is somewhat at odds with Oaksford's (2002) assumption that contrast classes constitute statistical minorities among logically complementary classes. The relative role of real-world knowledge and statistical size in constructing contrast classes may be different between abstract tasks to which the concept has hitherto been applied and tasks that draw on social knowledge such as the CGG (cf., Gale & Ball, 2006 , 2012 .
The present studies explain why ordinary practices of scientific thinking produce asymmetrical hypothesis generation and test around social categories that are marked by category norms. As such they provide a justification for expending resources to diversify samples, as demanded by the NIH Revitalization Act. Without such checks, independent scientists could inadvertently and jointly produce a scientific discourse made up of race-specific hypotheses from observations of Black people and race-general hypotheses from observations of White people. Such thinking should not be considered biased from traditional cognitive perspectives that emphasize individual thinkers' rational appraisal of the information contained in data (e.g., Cherubini et al., 2005; Evans, 2007; Klayman & Ha, 1987; Oaksford & Chater, 1994) . Nor would such thinking necessarily be 'prejudicial' in the sense of being motivated by hostility or preference for one group over another. However, such thinking processes could have objective asymmetric effects, exacerbating the general tendency for Blacks to have race more than Whites do (Fiske, 1998) . To the extent that such categories are induced during scientific discourse and are used to ground explanation, then they likely help to explain why explanations of Black-White differences take Black people as the effect to be explained (Hegarty & Bruckmüller, 2013; . Indeed, Wason (1962, p. 250 ) noted the link between his 2-4 -6 task and the tendency to alight on the most available explanation of a data set, describing his task as addressing the basic problem "Under what circumstances is a possible explanation accepted as the only explanation?" Consequently, these studies have implications for how diversity science might proceed (Plaut, 2010) . Color-blind ideologies that turn the volume down on race have often been favored in many policies to manage diversity (Sue, 2004) . However, these policies can have negative implications for stereotyping and equality, and many favor multicultural policies that turn the volume up on distinct positive group attributes (Plaut, 2010; Wolsko, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2000) . For example, color-blind generation of clues in Study 6 would have lead guessers to discover the experimenter's rule about Black celebrities but not the rule about White celebrities, as only the latter requires the generation of negative cases (Study 2). At least during the process of formulating and testing hypotheses, category norms turn the volume down on Whites' race while turning the volume up on the race of nonWhites. Consequently, interventions that turn the volume up or down on all identities are likely to have mixed results, and unlikely to equalize the salience of racial identity for all.
The present studies advise against relying on the effects of analogies or changes in the informatic environment (Studies 3 through 5), but suggest that changing the semantic information stored may mitigate these asymmetries. Participants who called to mind the names of Black actors more readily while not thinking about race were more likely to discover that White people are White. Non-White participants were somewhat more likely to draw such exemplars to mind. Accordingly, interventions that broaden the range of exemplars within a White person's category of film stars might change the perception of an all-White group of film stars as something that goes unnoticed.
Concluding Thoughts
In the final section, I discuss three limitations of the present research that suggest future avenues. First, I only used the CGG to investigate the norm of Whiteness here. But the CGG is a flexible tool that could be used to investigate many other categories in which Whiteness is not the racial norm (see for examples such as professional basketball player and jazz singer). The CGG could provide quantifiable estimates of the extent to which hypothesis testing is as strongly affected by the implicit Blackness of Black celebrities in such categories and populations. Examining categories other than race, such as gender or class, affords other ways to go beyond the current studies. Several such "defaults" were suggested by the data but there is insufficient space to discuss them in depth. For example, several participants ventured rules about the marital status, parental status and relationship history of the celebrities, but rarely did participants venture the hypothesis that all of the film stars were heterosexual, suggesting a strong heteronormative default (Hegarty, Pratto, & Lemieux, 2004) . Both the range and relative strength of such different defaults could be assessed by further studies. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
Second, it is an irony of this paper that the limitations of the sample leave some doubt as to whether the difficulty in conceptualizing White people as White is particular to White people or more general. The White and non-White participants on the mostly White British campus where Studies 2 through 4 were conducted performed similarly in the CGG. However, among U.S. participants in Study 5, Whites mentioned the race of Black actors far more frequently than Whites did. Under other cultural conditions, other differences by participant ethnicity might emerge. The British students studied here were familiar with globally accessible Hollywood films whose stars tended to be White. But, the studies reported here should not be taken to mean that the exemplars that the make up the category norms of cinemagoers in Lagos, Hong Kong or Mumbai who are more familiar with the films produced by the large industries in those cities would necessarily be normed on White film stars.
Finally, the laboratory studies reported here leave a journey to traverse back to the real world context of scientific induction. Content analysis of scientific discourse provides one way to examine such norms in the naturalistic environment of scientific thinking, as has been accomplished in regard to research on the impact of category norms on explanations (Hegarty & Buechel, 2006) . Studies of single-gender groups prompt more discussion about gender-specific limitations of findings when the participants are female than when they are male (Ader & Johnson, 1994) . The present findings suggest that similar patterns might be observed in scientific discourse in regard to race.
Content analysis also allows detection of changes in implicit norms about identity in scientific discourse over time. There are several examples of such successful changes in psychology. Most notably, cultural psychologists have achieved greater theoretical sophistication by emphasizing how many seemingly universal features of human psychology are a consequence of cultural particulars such as independent selves that are common in individualist cultures (Adams & Markus, 2004) . Similarly, risk researchers have noted that risk-seeking is not a general property of people, or even of men, but is explained by risk-seeking among Whites men who enjoy higher status (Flynn, Slovic, & Mertz, 1994) . Such theorizing about groups previously assumed to be defaults can enhance understanding and enrich explanation of human differences. Indeed, given the underrepresentation of all ethnic minority actors in top Hollywood roles, there is better evidence that White people are overrepresented among Hollywood actors, although the claim that Black actors are underrepresented is more commonly heard (J. T., 2016). Like medicine, psychology is increasingly squaring up to the challenges created by a history of studying only a thin slice of humanity. The present studies suggest that to do so, we may need to not only diversify samples, but also value explicit theorizing about the particular attributes of overstudied groups such as people in Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic societies (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010) . The present studies provide a basis for understanding how such identities, however atypical among humans as a group, nevertheless can act as assumed norms for human being in a science such as psychology. As such this research contributes to the recognition of how we may change the circumstances under which "a possible explanation [of group differences is] accepted as the only explanation" (Wason, 1962, p. 250) .
